Abstract. This paper first introduces the concept of universal designated verifier ring signature (UDVRS), which not only allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without revealing their identities, but also allows any holder of the signature (not necessary the signer) to designate the signature to any designated verifier. According to whether the designator has a registered public key, two kinds of UD-VRS are proposed. In order to distinguish the two types of UDVRS, we call it UDVRS Proof (UDVRSP) if the designator has not a registered public key, and this protocol is interactive. We give the formal security definitions and notions of UDVRS and UDVRSP. Then, we propose a UDVRS and a UDVRSP scheme, with rigorous security proofs without random oracles.
Introduction
A ring signature scheme [10] allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without revealing their identities. Different from a group signature scheme (for example, [3] ), the group formation is spontaneous and there is no group manager to revoke the identity of the signer.
Ring signature schemes could be used for whistle blowing [10] , anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc groups [1, 6] to keep the anonymity of the signer and can be publicly verifiable. However, consider a situation, where an authority, who has got a secret as well as a ring signature of the secret from a whistleblower of a group, would like to confirm validity of the secret by seeking help from a third party. In this situation, the authority sends the secret to the third party, and wants to convince the third party that he indeed holds a ring signature on the secret from a whistleblower of the group. However, he does not want to send the signature away. A normal ring signature will not reveal the identity of signer, however, cannot satisfy the scenario. So, we present a new notion UDVRS to solve this problem. The UDVRS allows the signature holder to designate a verifier and generate a designated verifier ring signature such that it can only be verified by the designator.
Related Work
Ring signature scheme was first formalized by Rivest [10] and the first practical ring signature [14] without random oracles was proposed by Xu, Zhang, and Feng. Very recently, Chow et al. [7] gave a formal security proof to [14] . The concept of designated verifier signature (DVS) was introduced by Jakobsson et al. [9] . These signatures are intended to a specific verifier, who is the only one able to check their validity. The notion of universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) was given by Steinfeld et al. [11] . These are ordinary signatures with the additional functionality that any holder of a signature is able to convert it into a designated verifier specified to any designated verifier of his choice. The first UDVS scheme without random oracles was proposed by Zhang et al. [16] . Very recently, a new notion called universal designated verifier signature proof (UDVS Proof) was proposed by Baek et al. [2] at AsiaCrypt'05. What is the difference between UDVS and UDVS Proof is that the designator does not need a registered public key in UDVS Proof, which is required in UDVS. In order to protect the privacy of signer, the notion of ring signature was combined with deniable authentication [9] . The result is called deniable ring authentication. In deniable ring authentication, only the signer can designate a verifier such that the signature can only be verified by the designator.
Contribution
In this paper, we first present formally the security model of UDVRS and also construct a UDVRS scheme. Meanwhile, we first present the security definitions and notions of UDVRSP, and construct a UDVRSP scheme in the standard model. CPG-The common parameter generation algorithm, on input security parameter 1 k , outputs a string params consisting of common parameters of the scheme.
Security Model

SKG-
The signer key generation algorithm, on input params, outputs a public key pk i and a secret key sk i for the user i. VKG-The verifier key generation algorithm, on input params, outputs a public key pk v and a secret key sk v . RS-The ring signature generation algorithm, that takes as input a secret key sk i , a message m and a set of public keys L including the one that corresponds to the private key sk i , returns the signature σ. RV-The ring signature verification algorithm, takes as input a set of L, a message m and σ, returns 1 or 0 for accept or reject, respectively. DRS-The designation algorithm, on input a set of public key set L including the one that correspond to the private key sk i , designated verifier's public key pk v , and a message/signature pair (m, σ), output designated verifier ring signature σ . DRV-The designated ring signature verification algorithm, on input σ , designated verifier's secret key sk v and a message m, outputs 1 or 0 for accept or reject, respectively. KR-The key registration algorithm, on input pk v , and proof knowledge of corresponding secret key sk v , output a pair (pk v , acc/rej), where acc/rej denotes the public key is valid or not, respectively.
The Oracles -RS The ring signature oracle, on input message m, L, returns a ring signa-
The designated verifier ring signature verification oracle, on input L, m, σ , pk v , returns a bit 1 or 0 by running the algorithm DRV.
The correctness requires that valid signatures can always be proved valid. So, we present our detailed security notions for unforgeability, non-transferability, and signer ambiguity for UDVRS in the following.
Unforgeability
There are two types of unforgeability to consider: Publicly verifiable ring signature unforgeability (PV-unforgeability) and designated verifier ring signature unforgeability (DV-unforgeability). Meanwhile, we also consider the strong version of security model for existential unforgeability [7] . DV-unforgeability always implies PV-unforgeability, because anyone able to forge a normal ring signature can transform it into a designated verifier ring signature. Thus it is enough to consider only DV-unforgeability. DV-unforgeability for UDVRS against adaptive chosen public key attack and message attack is defined as in the following game involving an adversary A.
-Let L = {P 1 , · · · , P n } be the set of n public keys in which each key is generated as ( 
Non-Transferability
Non-transferability is defined through the following game involving A, S, and D. A is an attacker that tries to brag about its interaction with the signature holder. S is a simulator that simulates the output of A. S is able to access A as a black-box. D is a distinguisher that tries to distinguish whether a given output is of A or of S.
-Let L = {P 1 , · · · , P n } be the set of n public keys in which each key is generated as (pk i , sk i ) ← SPG(1 k ). A and S are allowed to access RS oracle. However, after the challenge message m is output, they may not access to RS oracle with respect to this challenge message.
-A and S are allowed to access KR oracle and DRV oracle. A is also allowed to access to DRS, which S is not allowed. 
Signer Ambiguity
In UDVRS, signer ambiguity means that it is hard to tell which signer out of the n possible signers who actually generates a ring signature or a designated verifier ring signature.
-Let L = {P 1 , · · · , P n } be the set of n public keys in which each key is generated as (
such that RV (L,m,σ) = 1.
-Any unbounded adversary accepts as inputs σ.
The adversary wins the game if he can output t such that t = t who signs the signature. The advantage of the adversary is the probability that he wins the game, over 
A UDVRS Without Random Oracles
Preliminaries
Let G 1 and G 2 be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g 1 be a generator of G 1 and g 2 be a generator of G 2 . We also let ψ be an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , with ψ(g 2 ) = g 1 , andê be a bilinear map such thatê : G 1 ×G 2 → G T with the following properties:
Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(u, v).
We introduce the following problem used in [7] :
for all i and τ . We say that the (q, n, t, )-DsjSDH assumption holds in (G 1 , G 2 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the (q, n)-DsjSDH problem in (G 1 , G 2 ).
The UDVRS Scheme
We construct a UDVRS scheme without random oracles.
CPG. Choose bilinear groups (G
the generator of G 2 , and g 1 =ψ(g 2 ). h is also a random generator of G 1 . Let H i be universal one-way hash function such that
2 ) as its key pair. The secret key is (x i , y i ) and the public key is (
3. VKG. 
the signature holder generates the designated verifier ring signature
Security Analysis
The correctness of the scheme is straightforward. Before prove the DV-unforgeability of the UDVRS, we first derive a new ring signature without random oracles from above UDVRS scheme. The system parameters are also
2 are the secret key and public key of user i, respectively. 2. RS. On input a secret key (x t , y t ), a message m and a set of public keys L including the one that corresponds to the private key (x t , y t ), it signs as follows: a. For i ∈ {1, · · · , n}\t, he picks z i ∈ R Z * p and computes
c. He computes σ t =ω 1/(x t +r t +y t H t (m)) with his secret keys (x t , y t ).
))] =ê(h, g 2 ). Otherwise, output 0.
Theorem 1. The new ring signature scheme is existentially unforgeable if (q, n)-DsjSDH assumption holds in bilinear groups, and it also achieves signer-ambiguity against unconditional adversary.
The new ring signature is a variant of [7, 14] . However, if directly use the ring signature [7, 14] , it is hard to construct a UDVRS by using the construction method in our paper. The new ring signature without random oracles is different from [7, 14] in RS and RV. However, it can also easily be proved to be secure without random oracles from the proof of [7] . [4, 16] ) Suppose that an adversary is given a pair (g, h) which is randomly chosen from uniform distribution of G 2 and if the adversary is able to generate a pair (x, y) ∈ G 2 such that log g x = log h y, then there exists an extractor that extracts log g x.
Definition 5. (Knowledge of Exponent Assumption
We can get the following security results. For the page limitation, reader can contact the author for full version of this paper if needed. CPG-The common parameter generation algorithm, on input security parameter 1 k , outputs a string params consisting of common parameters of the scheme. SKG-The signer key generation algorithm, on input params, outputs a public key pk i and a secret key sk i for the user. RS-The ring signature generation algorithm, that takes as input a secret key sk i , a message m and a set of public keys L including the one that corresponds to the private key sk i , returns the signature σ. RV-The ring signature verification algorithm, takes as input a set of L, a message m and σ, returns 1 or 0 for accept or reject, respectively. Transform-On input signature σ, it picks a secret mask sk and generates a transformed signature σ .
IVerify-This is an interactive verification protocol between a designator P and a designated verifier V. Common input for P and V are a set of public key L, a transformed signature σ and a message m. P's private input is sk . V does not have any input. The output of this protocol is 1 or 0 depending V accepts or rejects.
The UDVRSP should satisfy correctness, unforgeability, and signer ambiguity. Definitions of unforgeability and signer ambiguity are the same with the ring signature.
Another essential security requirement is resistance against impersonation attack. This can be divided into two categories: Type-1 and Type-2 attacks.
In Type-1 attack, an attacker who has obtained a transformed signature participates in the IVerify protocol as a cheating designated verifier and interacts with an honest designator a number of times. The target of the attacker is to impersonate the honest designator to other honest designated verifier.
In Type-2 attack, the attacker simply ignores the transformed signature that he has obtained before but tries to create a new transformed signature on his own and use this to impersonate the honest designator to an honest designated verifier in the IVerify protocol. For more details, please refer to [2] .
The UDVRSP Scheme
The algorithms CPG, SKG, RS, RV are the same with their corresponding algorithms in section 3.
-Algorithms CPG, SKG, RS, and RV are the same with corresponding algorithms in section 3. -Transform. On input the signature σ = {(σ 1 , r 1 ), · · · , (σ n , r n )} on message m, the signature holder chooses z ∈ Z
